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Abstract: Research and policy debates over natural resource management in 
developing countries have largely focused on identifying the set of institutions 
that best supports resource sustainability and poverty alleviation. We argue 
that beyond finding the right institutional fit for a social-ecological system, it is 
equally important to understand how context affects the design and outcomes 
of institutional reforms. We propose a refined conceptualisation of context, 
based on a revision of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. 
We defend a systematic analysis of context, distinguishing between contextual 
factors affecting the fitness to local socio-ecological conditions and contextual 
factors that mobilise power such as political-economic interests and prevailing 
discourses. We illustrate our argument with empirical research on land-tenure 
reforms that have been implemented since the 1980s in northern Vietnam. The 
proposed analytical framework and conceptualisation of context allows a more 
pervasive understanding of contextual factors, enabling the incorporation of the 
forms of power that give meaning and legitimacy to institutional change.
Keywords: Context, discourses, forest, institutions, land tenure, poverty, power, 
Vietnam
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1. Introduction
“Getting the institutions1 right” has been advocated by a wide range of scholars 
and development practitioners as a crucial step towards poverty2 alleviation and 
sustainable natural resource management (NRM). The importance of context in this 
question of institutional performance has also increasingly been acknowledged in 
common-pool resource studies, hereafter called “commons studies” (Edwards and 
Steins 1999; Agrawal 2001; Auer 2006). The evidence that the same institutional 
arrangements can be successful in one setting and fail in another (Acheson 2006) 
has led to the conclusion that there is no institutional panacea (Meinzen-Dick 2007; 
Ostrom 2007). In this light, understanding the contextual factors and mechanisms 
that create different outcomes for the same institutional reforms appears as an 
important endeavour to avoid the fallacy of devising new blueprint approaches.
A particularly prominent example of institutional reforms for pro-poor NRM 
has been that of land reform. Redistributive land reform was a core component 
of socialist policies across Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa in the 20th century. 
Other types of land reform initiatives that followed in the last decades range 
from land registration and titling, tenancy reform, consolidation of landholdings, 
to restitution of land rights to historical owners (Sikor and Müller 2009). An 
assumption that has dominated the latest set of initiatives is that secure land tenure – 
that is “the terms and conditions on which natural resources are held and used” 
(Bruce 1986 in Scoones 1995) – will positively affect agricultural and economic 
growth (Deininger et al. 2009) thereby reducing poverty.
This argument has generated heated debate regarding both its theoretical 
underpinnings and its validity in the field (Peters 2009; Place 2009). A salient 
feature of this debate is the diversity of research results with ambiguous, or even 
contradictory, findings. In his recent review of the economics literature on land 
reform in Africa, Place argues that both theoretical and empirical research has 
1
 By institution, we mean ‘the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and 
structured interaction including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, 
churches, private associations, and governments at all scales’ (Ostrom 2005, 3).
2
 Poverty is understood following Sen’s capability approach as the deprivation of the capabilities or 
freedoms people have ‘to do the things they have reason to value’ (Sen 1999, 18).
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produced “what appears to be ambiguous, inconsistent and conflicting findings 
in terms of how land tenure variables affect agricultural productivity” (2009, 
1333). He concludes that such variability arises from different contexts and that 
contextual factors should be given a greater attention. Similarly, in her review of 
the contribution of anthropological research to the analysis of land tenure and land 
reform in Africa, Peters (2009) concludes that the main failures from state-led 
land policies stem from their overlook of the political, cultural and social context 
in which they have been implemented.
A wide range of local or distant factors influencing institutional performance 
have been documented in the literature. The latter, mostly based on case studies, 
has provided detailed understanding of causal explanations in many national, 
regional or local settings, but this understanding is messy and fragmented. Few 
frameworks allow a comparison of context across a large number of case studies. 
As a whole, efforts to characterise and systematically integrate context into 
institutional design and analysis have remained limited.
This paper aims at narrowing this gap by refining the concept of context, based 
on the revision of an existing institutional analysis framework (Clement 2010). 
Illustrating our argumentation with the case study of land reform initiatives in northern 
Vietnam, we defend that this analytical frame is well suited to identify the contextual 
factors and processes that create discrepancy between institutional reforms and their 
outcomes. Ultimately, we hope that its use will support a better integration of context 
into policy debates, facilitate comparative analyses and contribute to the design of 
sound recommendations for institutional design and policy formulation.
This paper is organised in five sections. The following section examines how 
context has been taken into account in previous land reform studies. Then we 
review different conceptual approaches to build our analytical framework. In the 
next section, we present an application of this framework to the case study of 
land reforms in Vietnam; we introduce the historical background of land reform 
initiatives in this country and explore the reasons of policy shortcomings. Lastly, we 
conclude on the lessons researchers and policy-makers can draw from a systematic 
and holistic context-based analysis of institutional performance.
2. Land reform, institutions and context
Before examining how context has been considered in earlier studies of land 
reform, we shall clarify what context means in this paper. “Context” comes from 
the Latin “contextus”, derived from Latin “textura”, meaning “a weaving” – 
a set of two threads very closely interlaced with each other. This metaphor 
reminds us of the intricacy of context with other factors, which makes it difficult 
to characterise. Cunningham said about policy: “Defining policy is rather like the 
elephant – you know it when you see it but you cannot easily define it” (Cunningham 
1963, cited in Keeley and Scoones 2003, 22). It does also apply very well to 
context. Importantly, what is understood by “context” basically depends on the 
unit of analysis. For example, an economist might define context as the legislative 
environment in which markets function, whereas a political scientist might rather 
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view context as the macro-economic conditions in which policies emerge, sustain 
or collapse. In this paper, we define “context” as the “dynamic factors influencing 
the design and performance of institutions over multiple governance scales”. 
What those dynamic factors entail is conceptualised in the next section.
2.1. Context and institutions in studies on land reform
Three major theories on institutions are said to have influenced3 the direction of 
land reform across countries and continents (Scoones 1995, 118): (1) the tragedy 
of the commons (Hardin 1968) which, by implying that natural resources cannot 
be managed sustainably without an external intervention, has recommended for 
their privatisation or nationalisation; (2) the property rights school (Demsetz 
1967), which has identified population pressure on land, technological and 
economic conditions as key drivers in forging land-people relationships and 
has largely recommended private property; and (3) the “assurance problem” 
approach (Runge 1981), which defends that over-exploitation of resources does 
not arise from free-riding behaviour but rather stems from a coordination problem 
among resource users. Ostrom (1990) and a large number of commons scholars, 
including anthropologists, human ecologists and natural resource economists, 
further developed our understanding of collective action to manage the commons, 
and more broadly our understanding of social-ecological systems (SESs). They 
notably demonstrated the limitations of Hardin’s theory through a variety of 
methods and evidenced that communities can and do manage natural resources 
sustainably under certain conditions (Ostrom et al. 2002).
Partially influenced by these theories, land reform has followed two major 
directions. First, most have promoted the formalisation of land property rights, 
whether to individuals or to communities. Second, the terms and conditions of 
land reform projects across countries have been almost exclusively defined by the 
State (Sikor and Müller 2009). Both courses of action have been challenged on 
different grounds but with a common reference to the importance of context.
Some scholars have argued that land-policy flaws lie in a misguided analysis 
of the actual roots of rural poverty. Poverty, in their view, is rooted in political-
economic conditions rather than in the lack of formally recognised individual 
property rights (Peters 2009; Sjaastad and Cousins 2009). Others have emphasised 
the need to consider land as a means to secure rights (for shelter, food, etc) rather 
than as an economic asset (Assies 2009) – recognising the role of discourses 
in giving meaning, and particularly legitimacy, to institutions. Viewing land 
as a means to achieve food security is likely to give more space to customary 
arrangements than considering land as a commodity.
3
 This is not to say that research has been the main driver for land reform. Various political-economic 
interests have also been at play, e.g., rallying of the peasantry base to the electoral constituency 
through land redistribution.
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Proponents of land rights formalisation have acknowledged that the latter was 
not sufficient to ensure economic development, but depended on multiple contextual 
factors (see review in Sjaastad and Cousins 2009). To quote only a few, these 
range from the presence of customary authorities, population density, urban/rural 
environment, migration patterns, ethnic tensions (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008) 
to local power disparities, market opportunities, agro-ecological potential (Place 
2009) or income level and existence of social security mechanisms (Assies 2009).
Another object of debate is whether land reform should be driven by the State 
(Sikor and Müller 2009). State-led land registration and titling have in several 
cases become a source of insecurity and have created conflicts or inequities 
because of their neglect of local customary arrangements (Assies 2009; Bouquet 
2009). A possible explanation is a mismatch between the institutional reform 
imposed by the State and customary institutions. But a more fundamental issue 
relates to whose voice is included in decision-making, whose claims matter and 
who has power to make decisions. As Sikor and Lund (2009, 2) recall “struggles 
over property are as much about the scope and constitution of authority as about 
access to resources”.
From this review, three types of contextual influences on the outcomes of 
land reforms are evidenced. First, policy design might be misguided by a poor 
understanding of the SESs targeted by the reform, where proposed institutions 
do not adequately address issues at stake or do not fit the SESs – it is a wrong 
diagnostic. Second, institutional reforms are as much the result of competing 
interests in and claims over natural resources as driven by the will to improve 
institutional performance. They have been commonly used to retain power, 
control population or keep the electoral base obedient, thereby hindering the 
achievement of their official objectives of poverty reduction, food security or 
environmental protection. Whose interests dominate policy processes is thus a 
key issue to analyze and predict policy outcomes. Third, the implementation of 
land reform initiatives is affected by multiple and diverse contextual factors, 
located outside of the SESs, that were not anticipated during institutional design. 
We examine in the next section how these three types of influence have been 
addressed theoretically in the broader literature on context and institutional 
reforms on NRM before proposing a framework for contextual analysis.
3. Building up a framework
3.1. Conceptual approaches to context in institutional reforms of NRM  
in general
Commons studies have been largely devoted to the second type of contextual 
influence mentioned above, that is analyzing the factors internal to the SES that 
affect institutional performance (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002). Stemming 
from the assumption that there is an optimum set of institutions for each SES, a 
large number of scholars have aimed at identifying general principles for institutional 
design that can be applied to a wide range of settings (Ostrom 1990). Borrowing from 
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various disciplines, including anthropology and economics, they have identified key 
factors contributing to institutional performance, such as group size (Agrawal and 
Goyal 2001), uncertainty of the resource (Wilson 2002) or the level of monitoring 
(Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). Under this approach, commons scholars have focused 
on the characteristics of the local SESs, sometimes with reference to larger economic 
or political forces, but often lacked an in-depth analysis of the latter.
Noticeably, anthropologists have offered thick understandings of the cultural 
and historical determinants of institutional functioning (Mosse 1997; Cleaver 
2000). Political ecologists have also enlarged the ‘contextual window’ in two 
respects: first by examining the role of socio-economic change and distant political 
forces in NRM (Robbins 2004); second, by exploring the intricate relationship of 
discourses, power and institutions (Hajer 1995; Escobar 1996). These bodies of 
knowledge have addressed, in particular, the first and third types of contextual 
influence mentioned before, related with problem framing and power. However, 
a lack of common analytical frame has hindered comparative political ecology 
studies and findings have hardly been translated into constructive policy 
recommendations (Walker 2006). Some scholars have also criticised an a priori 
focus on political factors in causal explanations (Vayda and Walters 1999).
We believe that institutional analysis offers a valuable starting point to develop 
an analytical frame if one can overcome its limited attention to power. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom 
and her colleagues (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom et al. 1994), is one of the 
most extensively used and tested frameworks in studies of common-pool resource 
management and offers a useful tool for comparative analysis. It is characterised by 
a set of general variables, which makes it applicable to a wide variety of settings. 
These are the biophysical conditions, the community attributes and the rules-in-use 
(a detailed presentation of the framework can be found in Ostrom 1999; Ostrom 
2005). Each variable is decomposed into a nested set of sub-variables, inducing a 
recognised “aptness for micro-scale analysis and operational clarity” (Auer 2006, 
216). A prominent feature of the framework is its linkages across governance 
levels – though this feature has been under-utilised by commons scholars. It links 
the operational level, where decisions directly affect resource access and use, to 
the collective-choice level, where the rules that govern resource access and use 
are designed, and to the constitutional level, where decisions impact the rules that 
govern how decisions are taken at the collective-choice level.
Earlier, a few scholars have taken steps to integrate context in the IAD 
framework. Edwards and Steins (1999) added a variable called “contextual 
factors” and proposed to identify local and remote contextual factors 
through retroduction. The latter is a valuable path to capture a wide range 
of causal determinants but the framework does not go very far into refining 
our conceptualisation of context. Furthermore, the role of context is limited 
to situations of extractive use and contextual factors are pre-identified as 
“demographic changes, technological development and the integration of the 
resource into the market” (ibid, 209).
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Another adaptation of the IAD framework was developed by Rudd (2004), 
who defined context as “exogenous driving forces”. The latter also include: “e.g., 
demographic, environmental or technological change” (ibid, 119) and the role 
played by context is similar to that envisioned by Edwards and Steins (1999), 
where context poses a threat or places a pressure on the SES.
Ostrom and her colleagues also recently made a step towards a broader 
consideration of context by adding the “political, economic and social settings and 
related ecosystems” as a variable into a revised version of the IAD framework, called 
the SES framework (Ostrom 2007). However, in our opinion, the added variable still 
lacks sufficient conceptual refinement to adequately address power issues.
Commons studies have usually focused on identifying what we define as 
the right “fitting contextual factors”. Those are the original variables of the IAD 
framework: the attributes of the community (including cultural determinants), 
biophysical conditions, and rules-in-use. These factors determine the institutional 
fit, that is, whether the new institutions are adapted to the characteristics of the 
SES. We recently proposed a revision of the framework to politicise it (Clement 
2010), where we added two variables: a) the political-economic context and 
b) discourses. We further develop the framework in this paper by proposing to 
conceptualise context as, on the one hand, the “fitting contextual factors” and, on 
the other hand, the “mobilising contextual factors”, defined as the two variables 
added to the framework (Figure 1). This is de facto a formalisation of the extension 
of the IAD framework adding a political-ecology perspective.
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Figure 1: Contextual framework for institutional analysis at the operational level (adapted 
from revised IAD framework, Clement 2010).
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The mobilising contextual factors operate both at the micro and macro-level 
and refer to the ‘factors that mobilise power’. The political-economic context 
shapes power dynamics and power distribution. Discourses are both an expression 
and instrument of power and knowledge. The categorisations of the world that 
discourses convey apply a specific structure of knowledge and power on society, 
prescribing what is right and wrong, normal and abnormal, legal and criminal, 
etc. From this perspective, we are interested in capturing the pervasive and micro-
forms of power described by Foucault (1975, 1976).
The mobilising factors interact with institutions in a variety of ways. Institutions 
affect power distribution and continuously shape the political-economic structures 
that have supported their creation and functioning. The political-economic context 
affects the design, implementation and outcomes of a given set of institutions 
at multiple levels. Discourses shape the meaning of institutions and affect their 
legitimacy by shaping actors’ beliefs and values.
Finally, we make full use of the often neglected IAD potential for multi-
level analysis by explicitly adding the “actors” and “action situations” variables 
from the collective-choice level to make explicit whose interest and whose 
decisions are shaping institutional change and who might have influence over 
the mobilising contextual factors. This also adds further agency to the analytical 
frame. Mobilising factors similarly affect the action arena at the collective-choice 
and constitutional choice levels as illustrated in the case study.
4. Case study
4.1. Historical background of land reform in north Vietnam
The area of interest for the study is the northern mountain region of Vietnam (Figure 
2), home to 11 million inhabitants (13 per cent of Vietnam’s total population), 
among which 55 per cent belong to ethnic minority groups (GSO 2009). The latter 
have in the past traditionally practised shifting cultivation in the uplands4, while 
in the midlands, farmers have commonly practised composite swiddening, a type 
of farming system which integrates both permanent wet-rice fields and rotating 
swidden plots. Land practices and farming systems in the midlands and uplands 
have changed considerably during the past decades. This study considers the land 
reform on land classified as “forestry land”, which covers 75 per cent of the total 
land area in the northern mountain region.
4.1.1. The collapse of the centrally planned economy
In the 1950s, the communist government of northern Vietnam progressively 
collectivised the means of production and controlled agricultural inputs and 
4
 “Uplands” are generally defined as the land above 600 m altitude and “midlands” as the land 
between 300 m and 600 m altitude. However, Morrison and Dubois (1998) remark that there is no 
clear definition of “uplands” and that the communes defined as located in the uplands do not neces-
sarily conform to the altitude criteria.
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products, first in the lowlands, then in the uplands from 1959. Land with a slope 
>25 degrees was classified as “forestry land”, meaning land for forestry purpose. 
Forestry land was nationalised and managed by a system of logging companies 
established by the State, called state forestry enterprises.
In the early 1980s, the country reached the culmination of a major economic 
crisis. Due to a progressive decrease of agricultural production under the 
collectivised system, living conditions and food security had regressed to the 
standards of the late 1960s (Kerkvliet 1995) and agricultural cooperatives were 
facing major economic problems. State forestry enterprises also encountered 
serious economic difficulties resulting from a reduction in state support and a 
shortage of forest resources to exploit following poor management (Nguyen 
Quang Tan 2006).
Decollectivisation was initiated gradually as a response to the economic crisis 
with the introduction of contract systems with households for paddy production 
in 1981. Vietnam shifted more radically to a socialist market-oriented economy 
in 1986 with the adoption of the Đổi Mổi policies. New rules and regulations on 
upland management were defined to address the emerging land conflicts that had 
multiplied between state forestry enterprises and local communities. In 1991, the 
Forest Protection and Development Law encouraged the allocation of forestry 
Figure 2: Administrative map of the northern mountain region of Vietnam (it includes the 
northeast and northwest sub-regions, which appear in pink).
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land and forest resources to households for their management, protection and 
commercialisation. The allocation of forestry land was truly propelled at the 
national scale in 1994 (Decree 02/1994/CP). The land allocation process has 
consisted of land demarcation, registration and issuance of land-property titles5 
(also called “red book certificates”).
4.1.2. Rights and responsibilities of households and communities for forest 
and forestry land
The 1991 Forest Protection and Development Law defined three sub-categories 
of forest and forestry land according to their intended uses6: (1) special-use 
forest/forestry land with an intended use for nature conservation (biodiversity 
preservation) and landscape protection (including historical and cultural heritage); 
(2) protection forest/forestry land with an intended use for protecting water 
resources and soil; and, (3) production forest/forestry land with an intended use 
for commercial activities: exploitation of timber or non-timber forest products. 
Forestry land designates land with or without forest cover planned for afforestation. 
Forest and forestry land classification determines the categories of recipients for 
forest- and land-use rights as well as their rights and responsibilities. Special-
use and protection forest and forestry land are managed by the State – but the 
management of protection forestry land can also be contracted to individuals 
and households. Production forest and forestry land is allocated to individuals, 
households and communities.
Communities have managed land and forest resources under three types of 
institutional arrangements: (1) tolerated customary management on ancestral 
land owned by the State [approximately 0.5 per cent of the total forestry land 
area in 2007 (Forest Protection Department (FPD) 2007)]; (2) formal contract 
arrangement with a state organisation for protecting forest, and (3) management 
on allocated land. Communities7 were formally recognised as legal forest and 
land users in the revised Land Law 2003 and in the revised Forest Protection and 
Development Law 2004. However, contrarily to individuals and households, they 
have not been devolved in the Land Law 2003 the rights to “exchange, assign, 
lease or donate the land use right; or to mortgage, guarantee or contribute capital 
using the land use right” (article 117).
The devolution of long-term land-use rights to individuals and households 
has been a cornerstone of state policies for rural development and poverty 
5
 Allocated land superficies ranged from 2 to 30 ha per household for time periods from twenty to 
over fifty years, depending on the land category (agricultural/forestry), family size, intended use or 
land cover.
6
 The category does not reflect the actual land use: production forestry land can be covered by natural 
forest and special-use forestry land can be degraded with a poor forest cover.
7
 Communities are defined in the 2003 Land Law as: “Communities of citizens, comprising com-
munities of Vietnamese residing in the same hamlet, village, mountainous village or highland village 
and similar residential areas with the same habits and customs or of the same line, which are allocated 
with land by or have land use rights recognized by the State” (article 9).
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alleviation. But, whereas the land distribution and titling has significantly 
improved livelihoods in the lowlands, it has had mixed results in the uplands 
(Dinh Duc Thuan 2005; Sikor and Tran Ngoc Thanh 2007). The imposition of 
individual property regime on formerly commonly managed land has succeeded, 
as targeted by the government, in halting shifting cultivation practices and fixing 
nomadic communities. However, it has in turn resulted in neither livelihood 
improvement nor better land stewardship. The recognition of the community as a 
legal recipient of land-use rights has been a much applauded change, but whether 
it will actually improve the livelihoods of the upland poor still remains uncertain. 
Using the contextual framework we proposed, in the next section we explore the 
contextual factors and processes that have created a gap between policy intentions 
and outcomes.
4.2. Applying the framework
Fieldwork was conducted over a 1.5-year continuous stay in Vietnam. Data collection 
included semi-structured interviews with 80 farmers in three villages of Hoa Binh 
province, 21 government officials in the provinces of Hoa Binh, Son La, Thai Nguyen 
and Yen Bai, and 36 national policy-makers (including civil servants, funding 
agencies, NGOs and researchers) in Hanoi. This long-term cultural immersion and 
regular interaction with researchers and policy-makers allowed acquiring a relatively 
accurate understanding of the context in which forest and land policies have been 
designed and implemented (Clement and Amezaga 2008, 2009).
We expanded the framework across multiple levels (Figure 3) to analyse 
the possible factors that have created a gap between the outcomes of two sets 
of policies. On the right hand side, the main decision-making levels (central, 
provincial and village) and governance levels as per Ostrom’s IAD framework are 
indicated (operational, collective-choice and constitutional). The policy decisions 
of forestry land allocation to individual households and to communities were taken 
by central policy-makers and hold both a constitutional and collective-choice 
character. They have changed the existing rules-in-use from a set of rules (1) to 
a set of rules (2) (Figure 3). Farmers take operational and collective-choice level 
decisions [for instance, when the local elite negotiate the rules of land allocation 
with local government officers (Sowerwine 2004)].
The framework was used as a way to categorise primary and secondary data. 
This categorisation was helpful to explore the processes that have created gaps 
between official policy objectives defined at the national level and outcomes 
observed at the community/household level (Clement and Amezaga 2009). Fitting 
contextual factors also affect policy decisions at the provincial and central levels. 
For instance, if we consider the biophysical conditions: the larger the area of 
forestry land in the province and the lower its accessibility, the more incentives 
provincial government officials have to encourage the allocation of forestry land to 
communities. Allocating larger patches of land to communities allows speeding up 
the allocation process compared to the lengthy process of demarcating individual 
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plots of land. The distinct effects of fitting and mobilising contextual factors are 
detailed in the next section for each set of institutional reform.
First, we start with the process of land allocation to individual households 
and, in the sub-section following that, discuss the process of land allocation to 
communities.
5. Discussion
5.1. Land allocation to individual households
5.1.1. Impacts of land reform on poverty and natural resources 
management
This section discusses the impacts of forestry land distribution and titling to 
individual households. First, it is worth noticing that the process of land registration 
in the uplands has faced serious difficulties and its overall progress has been slow. 
The latest available official forestry land allocation figure indicates that, in 2007, 
75 per cent of the forestry land area was officially ‘allocated’ (FPD 2007), but 
only 31 per cent was actually devolved to households, communities and other 
private organisations in 2007 and 2010 (FPD 2007, 2010). The rest still remains 
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in the hands of diverse state organisations (people’s committees, state forestry 
enterprises, army units and forest management boards).
Several studies have reported that forestry land allocation in the northern 
uplands of Vietnam has not only failed to reduce poverty but has, on the contrary, 
aggravated food insecurity (Dinh Duc Thuan 2005; Jakobsen et al. 2007). Land 
allocation, coupled with settlement schemes, has led upland farmers to replace 
swiddening cultivation with fixed cultivation – which was one of the major aims 
of the Government of Vietnam (GoV). However, fixed cultivation has not resulted 
in increased agricultural productivity as expected. On the contrary, the shortening 
or suppression of fallow periods has led to soil nutrient loss and decreased soil 
fertility (Le Trong Cuc and Rambo 2001; Castella et al. 2006; Jakobsen et al. 
2007). As a consequence, farmers have stopped cultivation in some areas, thereby 
losing their major and often unique source of cash income – with no or few 
other livelihood options available (Jakobsen et al. 2007; Clement and Amezaga 
2008). On the contrary, agricultural intensification and increased crop yields 
were observed in some villages which had resisted the allocation process (Sikor 
2006).
Furthermore, whereas the allocation of agricultural land in the lowlands had 
followed an egalitarian process8, the allocation of forestry land has been largely 
captured by the local elite, widening the socio-economic gaps between the poorest 
members of the community and the better-off (Castella et al. 2002; Sowerwine 
2004; Clement and Amezaga 2008). The main criteria to select recipients of 
forestry land are the financial ability and the willingness of the household 
to afforest the bare land or to manage the forested land (Decree 02/1994/CP). 
Better-off households were thus usually preferred. They often received the most 
accessible land, close to the community settlement. Furthermore, only better-off 
households have had the ability to make long-term investments and the required 
market connections to engage in forestry activities (Clement and Amezaga 2008). 
In addition, land privatisation led to the reduction of common-pool resources 
such as non-timber forest products and grazing areas, which was of particular 
importance for the poor (Gomiero et al. 2000; Hager 2006). Lastly, considering 
non-economic aspects of poverty, land allocation was observed to have disrupted 
some of the social, cultural and religious relationships that ethnic minority groups 
had developed with land and forest (Pholsena 2003; Rambo and Jamieson 2003).
5.1.2. Fitting contextual factors
Findings from our study in Hoa Binh Province (Clement and Amezaga 2008, 2009) 
and from other studies led in the northern uplands of Vietnam (e.g., Celander and 
Hoang Xuan Ty 2000; Gomiero et al. 2000; Castella et al. 2006) suggest that the 
outcomes of land allocation have resulted from the neglect of three important 
fitting contextual factors. Primarily, the inadequacy of state-imposed institutions 
8
 Inequities in landholdings and means of production have however widened since allocation 
(Haroon Akram-Lodhi 2005).
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with the local biophysical conditions was a central policy flaw. Contrarily to the 
lowlands, upland soil is characterised by a low fertility and the addition of inputs 
is difficult because of low accessibility and steep slopes (notwithstanding the fact 
that many upland farmers do not have the financial ability to buy fertilisers). This 
was supported by evidence from the fieldwork conducted by the authors (Clement 
and Amezaga 2008) and by others’ works in the northern mountain region. Land 
allocation has added a serious constraint to the viability of upland farming systems 
(Gomiero et al. 2000; Castella et al. 2006). Empirical evidence thus supports 
the theoretical claim that common property is generally better adapted to large 
land areas with low productivity and low accessibility than individual property 
(McKean 2000).
Second, state-imposed institutions have been in conflict with the local rules-
in-use, which relied on collective arrangements. Individual property rights were 
not only incompatible with shifting practices, but they also clashed in some 
areas with the local rules for fixed paddy cultivation (Sikor 2006). Furthermore, 
individual property did not fit the collective rules-in-use that governed grazing 
and the collection of non-timber forest products (Celander and Hoang Xuan Ty 
2000). In our case-study area, the rigidification of the rules for land management 
broke the fragile equilibrium that had made possible the cohabitation of grazing 
and cultivation activities (Clement and Amezaga 2008).
Lastly, land registration has not acknowledged the beliefs, cultural practices 
and social relations of many ethnic groups – which led to resistance and conflicts 
(Scott 2000, Sikor 2006). For instance, Sikor demonstrates how villagers in a 
commune of northwestern Vietnam have resisted land registration because it did 
not acknowledge the complex and dynamic social relations they had developed 
with land (2006). The land tenure reform also clashed with the rituals related to 
the choice of a particular area for cultivation of some ethnic groups (Pholsena 
2003).
5.1.3. Mobilising contextual factors
Despite the significance of fitting contextual factors, our analysis would 
be incomplete if it only considered the mismatch between state-imposed 
institutions and the SES. Pervasive drivers have also greatly contributed to policy 
shortcomings.
First, the political-economic context has not encouraged the development 
of economic activities associated with land privatisation. Land allocation has 
indirectly restricted agricultural activities as it has been coupled with the process 
of land classification. Most upland allocated is classified as forestry land, where 
agricultural activities are severely restricted or forbidden. In addition, despite 
its stated commitment to develop “social forestry” (meaning in the Vietnamese 
context, “forestry let to the people”), the GoV has provided few incentives to 
households to engage in forestry activities. Instead, afforestation programmes 
have supported the provincial forest administration and state forestry enterprises 
by targeting central subsidies on protection and special-use forestry land rather 
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than providing incentives to farmers for productive activities (Clement and 
Amezaga 2009). Upland farmers have therefore had few options available to 
benefit from the land for which they had received property rights. Land allocation 
also conformed to strong geopolitical interests, as it facilitated the control of 
ethnic minority population and the securitisation of border areas.
Secondly, upland allocation has failed to reduce poverty because prevailing 
discourses framed the problem according to biased or false beliefs. Two influential 
narratives favoured upland allocation. One was relating to deforestation and 
land degradation, two issues that had become key concerns for policy-makers in 
the 1990s. The heroes, villains and victims of the story were clearly identified: 
“In terms of the evolution of barren lands or forest land degradation, sedentary 
shifting cultivation9 is the most extensive cause” (World Bank 1995, ii). Since at 
least the French colonial regime, discourses have portrayed shifting cultivation as 
an environmentally destructive and inefficient practice, which is the product of 
the low level of education and supposed backwardness of ethnic minority people 
and of poverty (ADB 1997). As a result of this discursive closure, it has never 
been considered that shifting cultivation could be desirable and practised because 
of its benefits under particular biophysical, institutional and cultural conditions.
The second narrative celebrated the pursuit of efficiency. The aim of policies 
would be to ‘rationalise’ agricultural production in the uplands by promoting 
agricultural intensification (ADB 1997) and ‘appropriate’ land-use practices (Hong 
Sy Dong 1995). In a post-socialist context valuing individual entrepreneurship, 
individual property was seen as the best option to maximise land efficiency. The 
focus on efficiency and productivity is evident in the land classification itself: 
all land not yet classified as agricultural or forestry land is considered “unused” 
as per the Land Law 1993, implying that all land with no apparent productive 
function (such as fallow land) has ultimately to be converted under a productive 
category (agriculture or forestry). In this narrow view, bare land was perceived as 
degraded and useless rather than as an important component of a larger land-use 
system for land resting or grazing activities10.
Besides misguiding policy processes, the discourses that supported institutional 
change have also participated to reinforce poverty through the beliefs and values 
they carried. Ethnic minorities have recurrently heard over the last decades that 
they are backward and responsible for deforestation. The resulting feeling of guilt 
and disparagement was salient in our case study area, where some farmers said the 
government had allocated the land: “because villagers have too much destroyed 
the mountains” (Clement and Amezaga 2008). Such stigmatisation might affect 
farmers’ feeling of wellbeing, thereby diminishing their capabilities to achieve 
9
 Sedentary shifting cultivation was defined in the same document as “cultivation practised by fixed 
households who shift cultivation sites” (World Bank 1995, 19).
10
 In official documents, bare land is used to describe “forestry land with no plants/trees or with trees 
which do not yet meet the criteria to be classified as forest” (MARD, 2003, 13). It can therefore mean 
grassland or fallow land which is not necessarily degraded. 
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what they value (Lamont and Small 2007) – quite the opposite of reducing 
poverty.
5.2. On the path of reform: land allocation to communities
5.2.1. Impacts of land reform on poverty and natural resources
This section now examines the process of land distribution and titling of forestry 
land to communities. The recognition of communities as legal recipients of 
land-use rights in Vietnam is relatively recent and has been largely restricted 
to pilot studies supported by donors and to a less extent by the government. 
According to official statistics, <7 per cent of the forestry land area has been 
officially allocated to communities and other ‘organisations’ in 2010 (FPD 
2010). This figure highly varies across provinces. For instance, Son La Province 
was an exception in its early devolution of land-use rights to communities in 
1994–199611 and has allocated almost half of the forestry land to communities. 
However, one should also be cautious with allocation figures when assessing 
the extent of decentralisation, as what has been called “community” has often 
been de facto the commune people’s committee, the local government executive 
body.
It is still early to assess on the ground the impact of the devolution of common-
property rights on poverty reduction. Sunderlin (2006) identified two reasons 
to be optimistic about policy outcomes. The first is that there are examples of 
communities who manage forest sustainably. The second reason is that the GoV 
has been successful in alleviating poverty in the past and that much of this success 
has been achieved in the rural sector, which is also where community forestry 
operates. Our analysis of the context under which state-led community forestry is 
being implemented suggests that, on the contrary, policy outcomes might fall far 
behind their expectations.
5.2.2. Fitting contextual factors
As indicated previously, community-based NRM has been widely practised in the 
mountainous regions of Vietnam and associated farming systems have shown to be 
well adapted to local biophysical conditions (Do Dinh Sam 1994; Tran Duc Vien 
2003) – at least as long as access to land and forest was not restricted by the State. 
A common-property regime thus seems to fit a large variety of conditions found 
in the uplands. Rapid and dramatic social and institutional changes resulting from 
sedentarisation policies, government migration programmes and the imposition 
of individual property might have reduced its present adequacy. Nevertheless, one 
could reasonably argue that its recognition is a positive move towards a higher 
institutional diversity – which would logically result in a better fit of institutions 
with the local context. Yet favourable fitting contextual factors are not a sufficient 
11
 The allocation of land to communities was however limited to seven communes of Yen Chau 
District.
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condition for common property rights to substantially contribute to livelihood 
improvement.
5.2.3. Mobilising contextual factors
Policy change in favour of communities has been supported by a propitious political-
economic context. It meets indeed a number of interests of both provincial and 
central governments. As explained by a Vietnamese senior cadre managing a donor-
funded community-based management (CBM) project: “Before, the government 
spent a lot of money for forest (…). With community forestry, people can manage 
forest with their own fund” (formal interview 2006). It is an opportunity for the 
State to reduce the costs associated with forest protection, notably by reducing 
the number of forest protection contracts which constitute a major transfer of 
funds to households12. In addition, devolving land-use rights to local communities 
eases the lengthy and costly process of land division, registration and titling to 
individuals and households (Clement and Amezaga 2009) – costs which are also 
affected by the biophysical conditions of the forestry land in the province (area 
and accessibility). As explained by a Forest Protection Department senior official 
in one of the visited provinces: “It is easier to allocate land to communities. We 
only discuss with the head of the village, no need to discuss with all villagers” 
(formal interview 2006). One can be dubious about the pro-poor outcomes of 
forest and land allocation based on the government’s sole interaction with the 
village elite.
At first glance, a positive discursive change has occurred with the apparition 
of the counter-narrative “forest protection and management are better achieved if 
left to communities” in public official discourses, replacing the old narrative on 
shifting cultivation. However, interviews suggest that the rationale for promoting 
CBM in popular discourses is very loose. The major argument advanced in favour 
of CBM was that it is a traditional way to manage forest which has worked in the 
past. The traditional character of a practice does not per se guarantee sustainable 
management. The arguments which have provided the theoretical basis for CBM, 
for example the participation of communities in crafting institutions have been 
left aside. Discourses have thus ‘black-boxed’ CBM by depicting the concept as 
inherently ‘good’ without providing an articulated justification.
The revised 2004 Law on Forest Protection and Development is also unclear 
on the legal rights of communities. Despite a section on forest allocation to village 
communities, the law does not recognise communities as legal owners (articles 
3 and 5). Furthermore, allocation to communities is not really encouraged: it is 
recommended either when forest is already managed or used “efficiently” by the 
community or when forest “cannot be assigned to organisations, households or 
individuals” (article 29). It tacitly suggests that the allocation to households is 
preferable to the allocation to communities.
12
 Households receive 50,000 VND per year per ha of forest protected and 5 million VND per ha of 
forest planted.
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Thus, whereas mobilising contextual factors were favourable to CBM’s 
legal recognition, a closer analysis of the discourses and politico-economic 
interests suggest that this ‘mobilisation’ is not only driven by the genuine will 
to improve the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities but also by other 
interests. The lack of sound arguments defending CBM in public discourses and 
the caution implied by the legislation for its adoption are likely to result in a poor 
implementation, driven by the bureaucratic and economic interests mentioned 
previously. Discourses indeed suggest that policy-makers have not imagined 
CBM as the devolution of rights to people to organise themselves but rather as a 
transfer of responsibilities to manage natural resources according to state rules. 
For instance, the chair of the Steering Committee of the Social Forestry Training 
Network in Vietnam, mentioned that one reason to support CBM is that: “The 
ethnic minority, who possess valuable knowledge (…), are not being utilised 
as much as they should be” (Bao Huy 2006, 47). Local people are viewed as 
the instruments of the State to achieve state goals – objectives are thus running 
counter to the anti-poverty goal of enhancing capabilities and freedoms.
6. Conclusion
When designing institutional reform for NRM, policy-makers and researchers 
have usually focused on “getting institutions right”, that is identifying which 
particular set of institutions works better for this purpose. Commons scholars have 
proposed general principles to design institutions that fit the characteristics of the 
SES considered (Ostrom 1990). At the same time, there has been an increasing 
recognition that the outcomes of institutional reforms highly depend on the context 
in which they are embedded.
We proposed in this paper a refined conceptualisation of context where we 
distinguished the “fitting contextual factors” and the “mobilising contextual 
factors”. While the former look at how well institutions are fitting the SES, the 
latter point towards the power and discursive processes affecting the legitimacy 
and functioning of institutions.
We integrated this conceptualisation of context within the IAD framework and 
applied this analytical frame to the case study of land reform in Vietnam. First, our 
analysis points towards the drivers for a poorly designed institutional reform. The 
blanket imposition of an institutional arrangement which was largely inadequate 
to the SESs of northern uplands is one of the major causes for the failure of land 
allocation to households in alleviating poverty. The incongruity between the 
biophysical characteristics of mountainous areas and how these regions have been 
imagined by the State has been a recurrent determinant for policy failures in the 
northern uplands of Vietnam (Sowerwine 2004).
Yet, more than 20 years ago, the members of the Central Executive Committee 
of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) had identified very similar roots of 
policy shortcomings in the uplands, namely a lack of in-depth knowledge of 
the region and the neglect of upland social and biophysical conditions when 
158 Floriane Clement and Jaime M. Amezaga
transferring lowland-based models (CPV 1989). Looking beyond the fitting 
contextual factors allows the analyst to understand why, despite this accurate 
analysis, policy-makers have repeated the same mistakes. The reason is that the 
mobilising contextual factors were not conducive for opening space for other 
narratives and institutions. Discourses were characterised by a problem closure 
which did not allow new evidence to change the prevailing narratives on the 
perceived evils of shifting cultivation. Furthermore, the government had political 
and economic interest to keep control over forested land and forestry activities. 
As a result, few farmers have been able to get economic benefits from the rights 
over land granted to them.
Land allocation to communities has aimed at overcoming the shortcomings 
of the previous land reforms in respect to the fitting contextual factors. It is 
argued that the rights to use upland as common-property will allow upland ethnic 
minority groups to revert to their ancestral land management system. Whereas 
discourses have changed towards a politically correct narrative praising CBM, 
they nevertheless remain unclear about its rationale. The prevailing argument is 
that CBM is ‘traditional’ – it has little to do with devolving power to communities 
to manage their land. Rather the political-economic context encourages devolving 
rights and responsibilities but not decision-making power.
Commons scholars have recently called for a greater institutional diversity 
(Ostrom 2005, 2007) as a reaction against the search for institutional panaceas. 
Encouraging institutional diversity is a key condition for institutions to fit the 
multiple SESs they support. In this paper, we show that the ‘right fit’ is necessary 
but not sufficient to achieve pro-poor outcomes. Besides fitting the SES they 
govern, institutions also need to be supported by a favourable political, economic 
and discursive context. In this respect, political economy and discursive policy 
analysis (e.g., Roe 1994; Hajer 1995; Fischer 2003) offer useful complementary 
tools to guide institutional analysts in crafting policy recommendations. We strongly 
encourage the use of these tools as part of the institutional analysis framework of 
researchers and policy-makers willing to guide pro-poor institutional reforms.
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